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Ivanti Connect Secure CVE-2026-104935 Chain: Why Oct 13 Patchers Must Patch Again

Ivanti Connect Secure's exploited CVE-2026-104935 chain gives unauthenticated root. The Oct 13 builds miss two CVEs; upgrade to 25.1.1.3 or 22.8R2.6 and check.

MGMCSA Guru Team November 18, 2026 8 min read
A rack VPN appliance with a three-link chain on its front panel, one link covered by a patch plate and two still glowing red, as a second plate moves in

If you patched Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) on October 13, 2026, you probably aren’t done. The releases Ivanti shipped that day, 25.1.1.2 and 22.8R2.5, fix CVE-2026-104935, the authentication bypass that opens an exploited chain to unauthenticated remote root. They don’t fix the other two links. CVE-2026-111357, the root privilege escalation, and CVE-2026-118527, a predictable-filename upload flaw, were fixed only on October 29 in 25.1.1.3 and 22.8R2.6.

Ivanti’s advisory says it’s aware of exploitation in the wild “affecting a limited number of customers at the time of disclosure” when the three CVEs are chained. CISA has all three in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog and says attackers used them for credential theft and data exfiltration. Volexity, which found the chain, also warns that Ivanti’s Integrity Checker Tool may not detect it.

The CVE-2026-104935 chain in plain terms

Volexity’s write-up, published October 13, describes three weaknesses that together give an attacker root on the VPN appliance without logging in:

  1. Authentication bypass (CVE-2026-104935). The public login script welcome.cgi doesn’t need authentication. ICS decides whether a request is allowed from the URL, but it decides where the request goes from a header. An attacker can send a request to the public URL and have it handled by a protected CGI script.
  2. Code execution. Through that bypass, the attacker reaches the wu.cgi upload handler. It writes the uploaded file to a predictable location before checking that it’s a valid ZIP, and the attacker runs the file in the short window before it’s deleted. Volexity says Ivanti tracks the bypass and this RCE together under CVE-2026-104935. Ivanti’s advisory separately lists CVE-2026-118527, “use of predictable filenames”, which lets a remote authenticated attacker upload attacker-controlled content to a known location on disk.
  3. Root (CVE-2026-111357). The privileged dsinvoked service runs maintenance tasks as root and looks up which program each task runs in DSCache, a shared configuration store. The attacker changes that entry in memory, has dsinvoked run its script as root, then restores the entry.

On its own, CVE-2026-111357 needs a local, authenticated foothold. The chain is what turns it into unauthenticated remote root, so the individual scores understate the risk.

Ivanti Connect Secure chain at a glance

CVE-2026-104935 Authentication bypass by spoofing (CWE-290); remote, unauthenticated; Ivanti CVSS 8.6 (High); KEV added 2026-10-13
CVE-2026-111357 Missing authentication for a critical function; local, authenticated privilege escalation; Ivanti CVSS 8.8 (High); KEV added 2026-10-30
CVE-2026-118527 Predictable filenames (CWE-340); remote, authenticated file upload; Ivanti CVSS 4.3 (Medium); KEV added 2026-10-30
Exploitation Chained in the wild; Volexity saw it from 2026-10-03 against 22.8R2.4, then the latest release
Fix for all three 25.1.1.3, 22.8R2.6, or 25.1.3.0 and later (not affected by the two later CVEs)

The MITRE record for CVE-2026-111357 shows a lower score of 7.0, since MITRE assigned that CVE. Ivanti’s advisory rates it 8.8 with a scope-changed vector.

Which release fixes what

Check every appliance you run against this table, taken from Ivanti’s advisory, last modified October 29, 2026.

VulnerabilityAffectedFixed in
CVE-2026-10493525.1.1.1 and prior; 25.1.2.2 and prior; 22.8R2.4 and prior25.1.1.2; 25.1.3.0, 25.1.3.1; 22.8R2.5
CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-11852725.1.1.2 and prior; 22.8R2.5 and prior25.1.1.3; 22.8R2.6

Ivanti’s solution notes add the rest:

  • 22.7.x and lower don’t contain this vulnerability. Ivanti says 22.7 reaches end of life on January 31, 2027.
  • 22.8.x: Ivanti recommends 25.1.1.3 or later. It calls 22.8 “only meant to be a temporary bridge” from 22.7 to 25.1, and 22.8 also reaches end of life on January 31, 2027. If you can’t move to 25.1.1.3 right away, 22.8R2.6 resolves all three CVEs.
  • 25.1.1.1 (ISA6000 or ISA8000): update to 25.1.1.3.
  • 25.1.3.0 and later (released July 2026, on ISA4500, ISA6500 or ISA8500) don’t contain the vulnerability. Ivanti says it first found part of the flaw through its own security program and patched it in 25.1.3.0.

Patch the Ivanti Connect Secure chain: order of work

  1. Inventory every ICS node. Include clustered nodes, DR units, and virtual or cloud instances. Record the exact version on each.
  2. Upgrade to a fixed build. Go to 25.1.1.3, or to 22.8R2.6 if you can’t leave 22.8 yet. Ivanti’s advisory lists the downloads as available in ILS.
  3. Check the platform before a 25.1.3.0 migration. Ivanti’s note says 25.1.3.0 needs the new ISA4500, ISA6500 or ISA8500 hardware, and virtual or cloud devices must be built new from the 25.1.3.0 template. Ivanti and CISA both point to the Ivanti Connect Secure 25.x Upgrade and Migration Compatibility Guide.
  4. Confirm the version after the upgrade. A node left on 25.1.1.2 or 22.8R2.5 is still exposed to the root escalation.
  5. Treat any appliance that was internet-facing while vulnerable as possibly compromised. Patching doesn’t remove credentials that were already stolen. The next two sections cover the checks and the recovery steps.

Check for compromise

Ivanti’s FAQ says there are limited indicators of compromise, points to Volexity’s blog for them, and tells customers to run the Integrity Checker Tool regularly. Run it, but don’t rely on it alone. CISA says organizations need network and memory forensics to find evidence of exploitation, because the attacker’s commands run in memory, and Volexity found that the chain patched library code in memory and restored the configuration store, so the tool saw no changes.

Volexity’s recommendations give defenders these checks:

  • Reverse proxy, WAF or load balancer logs. Look for large numbers of requests to /dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgi carrying an X-DSCGI-PATH header with values similar to the two below. Volexity expects attackers to find other paths, so alert on any mismatch between the URL path and the X-DSCGI-PATH value.
X-DSCGI-PATH: /home/webserver/htdocs/dana/fb/smb/wu.cgi
X-DSCGI-PATH: /home/runtime/tmp/<MD5(filename)>
  • Files on the appliance. Volexity found working files in /tmp/, including Python helpers and JSON output, and a renamed tcpdump binary at /data/.icscap/dsstatmond writing rotating packet captures. The .icscap directory is hidden from normal listings.
  • Log gaps. The attacker rewrote /home/runtime/dlogs/debuglog and /var/log/audit/audit.log to remove recent entries. Compare them with logs kept off the box, such as your SIEM and firewall logs.
  • Activity from the appliance’s IP. Volexity saw LDAP queries for LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys, a Kerberoasting tool, password spraying and LDAP packet capture. Volexity says signs such as attempts to move laterally from the ICS appliance should be forensically investigated.
  • Indicators. Volexity published related indicators on its GitHub page and named 108.165.147[.]64 as the host used for the operation.

Volexity tracks the actor as UTA0576 and assesses, with low confidence, that its motives are criminal rather than espionage.

Ivanti Connect Secure response checklist

  • Every ICS node runs 25.1.1.3, 22.8R2.6, or 25.1.3.0 or later
  • No node is left on 25.1.1.2 or 22.8R2.5 after the October 13 patch
  • Off-box logs searched for welcome.cgi requests with an X-DSCGI-PATH header
  • Integrity Checker Tool run, with memory and network forensics where exposure is likely
  • AD service account used by the ICS LDAP auth server rotated
  • LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys reviewed if the appliance was exposed
  • Migration off 22.7 and 22.8 planned before January 31, 2027

If you find signs of compromise

CISA summarizes Ivanti’s recovery procedure in four steps:

  1. Back up the appliance configuration.
  2. Factory reset the appliance and upgrade it to the latest version. For cloud and virtual systems, rebuild the instance and upgrade.
  3. Restore the configuration from the backup.
  4. Reset passwords for all accounts, including domain, administrator and local accounts. Revoke and reissue stored certificates, and reset stored API keys and license server credentials.

Because Volexity saw the attacker pull the domain credentials ICS uses for LDAP and then query Active Directory through that service account, rotate that account too. If the appliance was exposed, treat the LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys that account could read as exposed as well.

Timeline

  • October 3, 2026: Volexity’s first observed exploitation, against 22.8R2.4.
  • October 13: Ivanti advisory and fixes for CVE-2026-104935 (25.1.1.2, 22.8R2.5); Volexity blog; CVE-2026-104935 added to KEV.
  • October 29: Ivanti updates the advisory with fixes for CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 (25.1.1.3, 22.8R2.6).
  • October 30: CISA adds both to KEV and revises its alert.

KEV due dates apply to US federal agencies, and all three have passed. For everyone else, the short deadlines show how urgent CISA rates the fix.

What to do now

Check the build on every Ivanti Connect Secure node today. If any node shows 25.1.1.2, 22.8R2.5 or older, upgrade it to 25.1.1.3 or 22.8R2.6, and if it was reachable from the internet while vulnerable, run the forensic checks and rotate the LDAP service account. Then put the 25.1 migration on the calendar before 22.8 reaches end of life on January 31, 2027. For another VPN appliance flaw on the same patch list, see our post on SonicWall CVE-2026-19868, and browse the vulnerabilities category for other exploited bugs.

Frequently asked questions

Is Ivanti Connect Secure CVE-2026-104935 being exploited?

Yes. Ivanti says it's aware of exploitation affecting a limited number of customers when CVE-2026-104935, CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 are chained. CISA added CVE-2026-104935 to its KEV catalog on October 13, 2026 and the other two on October 30.

I patched Ivanti Connect Secure on October 13. Am I protected?

Not fully. The October 13 builds, 25.1.1.2 and 22.8R2.5, fix only CVE-2026-104935. CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 are fixed in 25.1.1.3 and 22.8R2.6, released October 29, 2026.

Which Ivanti Connect Secure version fixes all three CVEs?

25.1.1.3 or 22.8R2.6. Ivanti says 25.1.3.0 and later are not affected, and 22.7.x and lower don't contain the vulnerability. Ivanti recommends 25.1.1.3 or later because 22.8 reaches end of life on January 31, 2027.

Will the Ivanti Integrity Checker Tool detect this exploitation?

It may not. CISA and Volexity say the attacker's commands run in memory and the chain restores what it changes, so the Integrity Checker Tool may miss it. CISA says network and memory forensics are needed to find evidence of exploitation.

What should I do if my Ivanti appliance was compromised?

CISA summarizes Ivanti's recovery steps: back up the configuration, factory reset and upgrade (rebuild virtual or cloud instances), restore the configuration, then reset all domain, administrator and local passwords, reissue stored certificates, and reset stored API keys and license server credentials.

Sources & further reading

Official vendor documentation referenced while writing this guide.

MG

MCSA Guru Team

IT & Systems Administration

We are working IT pros and system administrators who spend our days in Windows Server, Microsoft 365, and the wider Microsoft stack. MCSA Guru is where we write down the fixes and walkthroughs we wish we had found the first time.

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