If you patched Ivanti Connect Secure (ICS) on October 13, 2026, you probably aren’t done. The releases Ivanti shipped that day, 25.1.1.2 and 22.8R2.5, fix CVE-2026-104935, the authentication bypass that opens an exploited chain to unauthenticated remote root. They don’t fix the other two links. CVE-2026-111357, the root privilege escalation, and CVE-2026-118527, a predictable-filename upload flaw, were fixed only on October 29 in 25.1.1.3 and 22.8R2.6.
Ivanti’s advisory says it’s aware of exploitation in the wild “affecting a limited number of customers at the time of disclosure” when the three CVEs are chained. CISA has all three in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog and says attackers used them for credential theft and data exfiltration. Volexity, which found the chain, also warns that Ivanti’s Integrity Checker Tool may not detect it.
The CVE-2026-104935 chain in plain terms
Volexity’s write-up, published October 13, describes three weaknesses that together give an attacker root on the VPN appliance without logging in:
- Authentication bypass (CVE-2026-104935). The public login script
welcome.cgidoesn’t need authentication. ICS decides whether a request is allowed from the URL, but it decides where the request goes from a header. An attacker can send a request to the public URL and have it handled by a protected CGI script. - Code execution. Through that bypass, the attacker reaches the
wu.cgiupload handler. It writes the uploaded file to a predictable location before checking that it’s a valid ZIP, and the attacker runs the file in the short window before it’s deleted. Volexity says Ivanti tracks the bypass and this RCE together under CVE-2026-104935. Ivanti’s advisory separately lists CVE-2026-118527, “use of predictable filenames”, which lets a remote authenticated attacker upload attacker-controlled content to a known location on disk. - Root (CVE-2026-111357). The privileged
dsinvokedservice runs maintenance tasks as root and looks up which program each task runs inDSCache, a shared configuration store. The attacker changes that entry in memory, hasdsinvokedrun its script as root, then restores the entry.
On its own, CVE-2026-111357 needs a local, authenticated foothold. The chain is what turns it into unauthenticated remote root, so the individual scores understate the risk.
Ivanti Connect Secure chain at a glance
| CVE-2026-104935 | Authentication bypass by spoofing (CWE-290); remote, unauthenticated; Ivanti CVSS 8.6 (High); KEV added 2026-10-13 |
|---|---|
| CVE-2026-111357 | Missing authentication for a critical function; local, authenticated privilege escalation; Ivanti CVSS 8.8 (High); KEV added 2026-10-30 |
| CVE-2026-118527 | Predictable filenames (CWE-340); remote, authenticated file upload; Ivanti CVSS 4.3 (Medium); KEV added 2026-10-30 |
| Exploitation | Chained in the wild; Volexity saw it from 2026-10-03 against 22.8R2.4, then the latest release |
| Fix for all three | 25.1.1.3, 22.8R2.6, or 25.1.3.0 and later (not affected by the two later CVEs) |
The MITRE record for CVE-2026-111357 shows a lower score of 7.0, since MITRE assigned that CVE. Ivanti’s advisory rates it 8.8 with a scope-changed vector.
Which release fixes what
Check every appliance you run against this table, taken from Ivanti’s advisory, last modified October 29, 2026.
| Vulnerability | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-104935 | 25.1.1.1 and prior; 25.1.2.2 and prior; 22.8R2.4 and prior | 25.1.1.2; 25.1.3.0, 25.1.3.1; 22.8R2.5 |
| CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 | 25.1.1.2 and prior; 22.8R2.5 and prior | 25.1.1.3; 22.8R2.6 |
Ivanti’s solution notes add the rest:
- 22.7.x and lower don’t contain this vulnerability. Ivanti says 22.7 reaches end of life on January 31, 2027.
- 22.8.x: Ivanti recommends 25.1.1.3 or later. It calls 22.8 “only meant to be a temporary bridge” from 22.7 to 25.1, and 22.8 also reaches end of life on January 31, 2027. If you can’t move to 25.1.1.3 right away, 22.8R2.6 resolves all three CVEs.
- 25.1.1.1 (ISA6000 or ISA8000): update to 25.1.1.3.
- 25.1.3.0 and later (released July 2026, on ISA4500, ISA6500 or ISA8500) don’t contain the vulnerability. Ivanti says it first found part of the flaw through its own security program and patched it in 25.1.3.0.
Patch the Ivanti Connect Secure chain: order of work
- Inventory every ICS node. Include clustered nodes, DR units, and virtual or cloud instances. Record the exact version on each.
- Upgrade to a fixed build. Go to 25.1.1.3, or to 22.8R2.6 if you can’t leave 22.8 yet. Ivanti’s advisory lists the downloads as available in ILS.
- Check the platform before a 25.1.3.0 migration. Ivanti’s note says 25.1.3.0 needs the new ISA4500, ISA6500 or ISA8500 hardware, and virtual or cloud devices must be built new from the 25.1.3.0 template. Ivanti and CISA both point to the Ivanti Connect Secure 25.x Upgrade and Migration Compatibility Guide.
- Confirm the version after the upgrade. A node left on 25.1.1.2 or 22.8R2.5 is still exposed to the root escalation.
- Treat any appliance that was internet-facing while vulnerable as possibly compromised. Patching doesn’t remove credentials that were already stolen. The next two sections cover the checks and the recovery steps.
Check for compromise
Ivanti’s FAQ says there are limited indicators of compromise, points to Volexity’s blog for them, and tells customers to run the Integrity Checker Tool regularly. Run it, but don’t rely on it alone. CISA says organizations need network and memory forensics to find evidence of exploitation, because the attacker’s commands run in memory, and Volexity found that the chain patched library code in memory and restored the configuration store, so the tool saw no changes.
Volexity’s recommendations give defenders these checks:
- Reverse proxy, WAF or load balancer logs. Look for large numbers of requests to
/dana-na/auth/url_default/welcome.cgicarrying anX-DSCGI-PATHheader with values similar to the two below. Volexity expects attackers to find other paths, so alert on any mismatch between the URL path and theX-DSCGI-PATHvalue.
X-DSCGI-PATH: /home/webserver/htdocs/dana/fb/smb/wu.cgi
X-DSCGI-PATH: /home/runtime/tmp/<MD5(filename)>
- Files on the appliance. Volexity found working files in
/tmp/, including Python helpers and JSON output, and a renamedtcpdumpbinary at/data/.icscap/dsstatmondwriting rotating packet captures. The.icscapdirectory is hidden from normal listings. - Log gaps. The attacker rewrote
/home/runtime/dlogs/debuglogand/var/log/audit/audit.logto remove recent entries. Compare them with logs kept off the box, such as your SIEM and firewall logs. - Activity from the appliance’s IP. Volexity saw LDAP queries for LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys, a Kerberoasting tool, password spraying and LDAP packet capture. Volexity says signs such as attempts to move laterally from the ICS appliance should be forensically investigated.
- Indicators. Volexity published related indicators on its GitHub page and named
108.165.147[.]64as the host used for the operation.
Volexity tracks the actor as UTA0576 and assesses, with low confidence, that its motives are criminal rather than espionage.
Ivanti Connect Secure response checklist
- Every ICS node runs 25.1.1.3, 22.8R2.6, or 25.1.3.0 or later
- No node is left on 25.1.1.2 or 22.8R2.5 after the October 13 patch
- Off-box logs searched for welcome.cgi requests with an X-DSCGI-PATH header
- Integrity Checker Tool run, with memory and network forensics where exposure is likely
- AD service account used by the ICS LDAP auth server rotated
- LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys reviewed if the appliance was exposed
- Migration off 22.7 and 22.8 planned before January 31, 2027
If you find signs of compromise
CISA summarizes Ivanti’s recovery procedure in four steps:
- Back up the appliance configuration.
- Factory reset the appliance and upgrade it to the latest version. For cloud and virtual systems, rebuild the instance and upgrade.
- Restore the configuration from the backup.
- Reset passwords for all accounts, including domain, administrator and local accounts. Revoke and reissue stored certificates, and reset stored API keys and license server credentials.
Because Volexity saw the attacker pull the domain credentials ICS uses for LDAP and then query Active Directory through that service account, rotate that account too. If the appliance was exposed, treat the LAPS passwords and BitLocker recovery keys that account could read as exposed as well.
Timeline
- October 3, 2026: Volexity’s first observed exploitation, against 22.8R2.4.
- October 13: Ivanti advisory and fixes for CVE-2026-104935 (25.1.1.2, 22.8R2.5); Volexity blog; CVE-2026-104935 added to KEV.
- October 29: Ivanti updates the advisory with fixes for CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 (25.1.1.3, 22.8R2.6).
- October 30: CISA adds both to KEV and revises its alert.
KEV due dates apply to US federal agencies, and all three have passed. For everyone else, the short deadlines show how urgent CISA rates the fix.
What to do now
Check the build on every Ivanti Connect Secure node today. If any node shows 25.1.1.2, 22.8R2.5 or older, upgrade it to 25.1.1.3 or 22.8R2.6, and if it was reachable from the internet while vulnerable, run the forensic checks and rotate the LDAP service account. Then put the 25.1 migration on the calendar before 22.8 reaches end of life on January 31, 2027. For another VPN appliance flaw on the same patch list, see our post on SonicWall CVE-2026-19868, and browse the vulnerabilities category for other exploited bugs.