Check Point has fixed CVE-2026-123039, a local privilege escalation in Gaia OS that lets any authenticated local user run commands as root on Check Point firewalls and management servers. The bug sits in the DynamicCLI daemon, and Check Point’s advisory, sk1000362, says the company “observed an active exploit of this vulnerability against a couple of dozen customers.”
The CVSS score is 7.8, and an attacker needs local code execution on the appliance first. On a perimeter device that doesn’t make it low priority: once someone has any foothold on a firewall, CVE-2026-123039 hands them root. CISA added CVE-2026-123039 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on November 13, 2026, with a federal due date of November 16 and its forensic triage flag set.
What CVE-2026-123039 does
Gaia’s dynamic, or extended, CLI is served by a root process called dynamic_server. Check Point’s advisory describes the flaw step by step:
dynamic_serverruns as root and listens on a local IPC socket,/tmp/dynamic_socket.- On affected versions, that socket is created world-writable (0777).
- The daemon doesn’t authenticate the process that connects to it.
- It executes whatever command string it receives, as root.
As a result, any authenticated local user can become root by writing a single request to the socket. Check Point stresses that it’s a local privilege escalation that requires the attacker to already have local code execution on the appliance. Neither Check Point nor CISA has published how attackers got that first foothold, and there’s no attribution.
CVE-2026-123039 at a glance
| Component | Gaia OS DynamicCLI daemon (dynamic_server) and its socket /tmp/dynamic_socket |
|---|---|
| Type | Local privilege escalation to root; CWE-732 and CWE-862 per CISA KEV |
| CVSS | 7.8 High (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H), Check Point as CNA |
| Exploitation | Active exploit seen against a couple of dozen customers (Check Point) |
| CISA KEV | Added 2026-11-13; federal due date 2026-11-16; forensic triage required |
| Not affected | Check Point Spark Firewalls and Smart-1 Cloud |
Affected products and fixed Jumbo Hotfix takes
Check Point lists these affected products: Check Point Force Firewalls, Management and Log Servers, Multi-Domain Security Management and Multi-Domain Log Server, and Maestro Orchestrator. The affected versions are R82.20, R82.10, R82, R81.20, R81.10 and R81. R81.10 and R81 are end of support (EOS).
The fix ships in the Jumbo Hotfix Accumulator (JHF):
| Version | Fixed in (sk1000362) | Affected per CVE record |
|---|---|---|
| R82.20 | JHF Take 14 and later | Take 10 or below |
| R82.10 | JHF Take 52 and later | Take 50 or below |
| R82 | JHF Take 132 and later | Take 130 or below |
| R81.20 | JHF Take 174 and later | Take 173 or below |
| R81.10, R81 (EOS) | No fix listed | Not listed in the CVE record |
The two sources leave small gaps. The CVE record doesn’t say anything about R82.20 Takes 11 to 13, R82.10 Take 51 or R82 Take 131, and the advisory lists no fix for the EOS trains. Install at least the take from sk1000362 for your version rather than relying on a take that sits in one of those gaps.
Patch CVE-2026-123039 and confirm the fix
- Inventory the JHF take on every box. That includes each cluster member, Maestro component, management server and log server.
- Install the fixed JHF for your version from the table above.
- Confirm the socket permissions. Check Point says a fixed box shows
srw-rw---- root config(0660), notsrwxrwxrwx(0777):
ls -l /tmp/dynamic_socket
- Check for blocked attempts after patching. The fix blocks and logs unauthenticated calls to Dynamic CLI:
grep "Rejected connection from unauthorized uid" /var/log/dynamicCli.log
Check Point’s example output is [DynamicCLI]: Rejected connection from unauthorized uid 99 (pid 123456). A non-zero or unexpected UID, such as 99 (nobody), means an escalation attempt happened and was blocked. Check Point says to correlate bursts of rejected connections with portal, web and authentication logs to find the source.
Mitigation if you can’t patch yet
Check Point’s mitigation is to stop the dynamic_server process and prevent it from restarting. The advisory publishes the commands as follows. The first dbset line appears in sk1000362 with no value, so copy it from the advisory itself rather than retyping it:
dbset process:dynamic_server
dbset :save
With dynamic_server stopped, the Dynamic CLI commands listed in sk144112 fail. To turn the process back on after you patch, the advisory gives:
dbset process:dynamic_server t
dbset :save
To check whether the process is running, use Expert mode:
ps auxw | grep -v grep | grep 'dynamic_server'
Check for signs of exploitation
The vulnerable daemon logs every command it receives to /var/log/dynamicCli.log. Legitimate requests come through a Clish wrapper that includes CPprofile.sh >> /dev/null; export SP_DISTRIBUTE=0; set -o noglob;. Check Point says any command without that wrapper may mean a command ran as root through the socket and needs investigation. Run these checks from the advisory on every Force Firewall or cluster member.
Received commands that don’t use the expected wrapper:
grep "Received =" /var/log/dynamicCli.log \
| grep -vF "CPprofile.sh >> /dev/null; export SP_DISTRIBUTE=0; set -o noglob;"
Use of the system() sink, which Check Point says is uncommon or absent in legitimate traffic:
grep -F "Received = #return_value#" /var/log/dynamicCli.log
Commands commonly associated with exploitation attempts:
grep -EI "Received =.*( id;| whoami| /etc/shadow| ncat| nc -| /dev/tcp| curl | wget | base64| useradd| authorized_keys)" \
/var/log/dynamicCli.log
A hit means root-level commands may have run on that box. Because CVE-2026-123039 needs an existing local foothold, a hit also means you need to find how the attacker got local access in the first place. Start with the portal, web and authentication logs, as Check Point suggests, and treat the box as part of an incident.
CVE-2026-123039 response checklist
- JHF take recorded for every gateway, cluster member, Maestro component, management and log server
- Fixed take installed: R82.20 Take 14, R82.10 Take 52, R82 Take 132 or R81.20 Take 174 or later
- ls -l /tmp/dynamic_socket shows srw-rw---- root config (0660) on every box
- dynamic_server stopped on R81.10, R81 or any box you can't patch yet
- The three dynamicCli.log checks run on every gateway and cluster member
- Any hit or rejected-uid burst correlated with portal, web and authentication logs
Timeline
- November 8, 2026: sk1000362 created.
- November 12: sk1000362 last modified; CVE-2026-123039 published.
- November 13: CISA adds CVE-2026-123039 to KEV.
- November 16: KEV due date for US federal civilian agencies.
What to do now
Check the JHF take on every Check Point gateway and management server, install the fixed take for your version, and confirm /tmp/dynamic_socket is 0660. Run the three log checks even on boxes you’ve already patched, because a patch doesn’t undo root access an attacker already had, and if they hit, find out how the attacker got local access. On R81.10 and R81, stop dynamic_server now and schedule the upgrade. For other perimeter flaws on the same patch list, see Ivanti Connect Secure’s exploited CVE-2026-104935 chain and the vulnerabilities category.